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MORALLY BLAMELESS WRONGDOERS AND THE 
CHANGE OF POSITION DEFENCE 
This article argues that, contrary to the position taken by 
some judges and commentators, morally blameless 
defendants who have committed torts of strict liability should 
be able to raise the change of position defence against 
claimants who sue for a release fee (also known as “Wrotham 
Park damages”). For the defence to be available, however, 
release fees need to be understood not as compensatory, as 
many currently insist, but as gain-based. The defence should 
not necessarily be available in the context of restitution for 
wrongs to all defendants who have changed position in good 
faith, as is the case for unjust enrichment by subtraction. 
Those who changed position by dissipating wealth for their 
own benefit should be denied the defence if their breach of 
the claimant’s rights was careless. Defendants who, in 
contrast, altered their circumstances in such a way that they 
derived no net enrichment as a result of their wrong should 
be allowed to rely on the defence, even if they acted without 
care. 
Craig ROTHERHAM 
LLB (Canterbury, NZ), LLM (Yale), PhD (Cambridge); 
Professor of Law, University of Nottingham. 
I. Introduction
1 For certain torts, such as conversion and trespass, fault is not an
element of the wrong and defendants who have infringed claimants’
rights are liable to compensate their victims for any loss suffered even if
their actions were morally blameless. What is less clear is the extent to
which defendants who have acted without fault in committing such torts
might be subject to pay a reasonable fee for the use of goods they have
possessed or land they have occupied. This article examines whether
morally blameless wrongdoers who are sued for their gains can benefit
from the defence of change of position that is widely available in the law
of enrichment by subtraction.
2 The issue is important not least because of the growth in 
“release fees”:1 awards reflecting what would have been a reasonable sum 
1 Reflecting the controversy as to its conceptual nature, there is no settled name for 
the form of relief in question. The term “Wrotham Park damages” is often 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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for the claimant to have charged in return for relaxing the right that was 
breached. However, the question is complicated by a controversy as to 
the conceptual nature of such relief. Given that the change of position 
defence is understood to be a response to restitutionary causes of action 
alone, it can be relevant in this context only if it is concluded that release 
fees are based on the defendant’s gain rather than the claimant’s loss. 
This article argues that there is a compelling case for allowing the use of 
the defence in this context and that this represents a powerful reason for 
favouring a gain-based analysis of this form of relief. Indeed, the 
importance of a gain-based reading of release fees was apparent in the 
decision of the High Court of Singapore in Cavenagh Investment  
Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv2 (“Cavenagh Investment”), a case in which a 
morally blameless defendant was permitted to rely on the change of 
position defence when sued for a release fee in the context of a trespass 
to land. 
3 The article considers accounts that purport to establish that, as a 
matter of analytic logic, the change of position defence has no place in 
the context of restitution for wrongs. It makes the case that changes of 
position involving dissipation of wealth for the defendant’s own 
purposes are morally salient in the context of restitution for wrongs in 
much the same way that they are in the context of subtractive unjust 
enrichment. To deny the defence to morally blameless defendants sued 
for release fees after they have altered their circumstances in reliance on 
their right to the benefit in question would fail to pay due respect to 
their interest in making informed choices about their spending. 
4 It should not, however, be assumed that we should necessarily 
apply the change of position defence in this context in the same manner 
that we do in cases of enrichment by subtraction. There are important 
distinctions that might potentially influence the courts in their 
application of the change of position defence in restitution for wrongs. 
First, a distinction can be drawn between different types of changes of 
position which have attracted the use of the defence in enrichment-by-
subtraction cases. Scholars have treated those cases in which defendants 
                                                                                                                               
favoured (the term was used for the first time in a reported judgment by Nourse LJ 
in Gafford v Graham (1999) 77 P & CR 73 at 86). However, the eponymous 
decision was far from being the first case in which such an award was made and the 
term provides little indication as to the nature of such relief. The term “release fee” 
preferred in this article was used in Kettel v Bloomfield [2012] EWHC 1422 (Ch) 
at [37], per HHJ David Cooke QC and the following variants can be found in other 
recent cases: “reasonable release fee” in 118 Data Resource Ltd v IDS Data 
Services Ltd [2014] EWHC 3629 (Ch) at [33], per D Halpern QC; “release fee 
damages” in HKRUK v Heaney [2010] EWHC 2245 (Ch) at [80], per Langen J; and 
“licence fee” in Stadium Capital Holdings (No 2) Ltd v St Marylebone Property 
Co plc [2010] EWCA Civ 952 at [13], per Sir Peter Smith LJ. 
2 [2013] 2 SLR 543. 
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dissipate wealth for their own benefit as paradigmatic of the defence. 
However, the defence equally operates in some instances where a 
defendant’s circumstances have changed in ways that do not result in the 
defendant ultimately gaining a net enrichment from the benefit in 
question. The denial of the change of position defence in circumstances 
in which a blameless defendant has gained no net enrichment from the 
benefit in question would be particularly egregious. A second potentially 
important distinction in this context is one which focuses on the degrees 
of fault. In cases of subtractive unjust enrichment, the defence is 
available to defendants who have acted in good faith, even if they ought 
to have realised that they had been unjustly enriched. In contrast, in the 
context of restitution for wrongs, it may be appropriate to deny the 
defence to good-faith defendants who were careless in breaching 
claimants’ rights, at least in those cases where the defendants have 
personally benefited in the course of changing their position. In 
circumstances in which defendants were not enriched, on the other 
hand, it should be enough that defendants changed their position in 
good faith. 
II. Innocent wrongdoers and change of position defence3 
A. Identifying when issue is likely to assume significance – 
Release-fee awards 
5 The question as to whether morally blameless wrongdoers are 
entitled to have recourse to the change of position defence will be of 
consequence only in cases in which it would be advantageous for 
claimants to found an action on the defendant’s gain rather than on their 
own loss. For torts in respect of which the defendant is strictly liable for 
the claimant’s loss, a claim in restitution will not ordinarily offer any 
substantive advantage over an action for compensatory damages. On the 
other hand, the change of position defence could prove important where 
a claimant seeks to recover gains that exceed her own loss. 
6 In theory, it is possible that the defence might assume relevance 
for this reason where a claimant, rather than suing for damages in tort, 
elects to sue in assumpsit for the gain made by the defendant in 
committing the wrong. This would be the case, where, for example, the 
claimant, instead of seeking damages in conversion for a wrongful sale 
by the defendant, sued in assumpsit to recover proceeds of sale by the 
                                                          
3 The issue is examined in Paul A Walker, “Change of Position and Restitution for 
Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 235. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 
 Singapore Academy of Law Journal  
 
defendant where those proceeds exceeded the value of the chattel sold.4 
Commentators examining the issue tend to treat this as the paradigm 
case for the application of the change of positon defence in the context 
of restitution for wrongs.5 In truth, however, claimants elected to sue in 
assumpsit rather than in tort because the former cause of action was 
subject to less onerous rules of evidence6 and to less restrictive adjectival 
rules governing its availability.7 Most of the disadvantages facing those 
seeking to sue in tort have been removed,8 with the consequence that 
the practice of claimants with an action in tort electing to sue in 
assumpsit has fallen into disuse.9 
7 Equally, the defence might theoretically have a role to play in 
the context of claims where the claimant seeks an account of profits. In 
practice, the defence is irrelevant in actions in contract or tort, where 
such relief is regarded as extraordinary and would never be awarded 
against defendants who had acted in good faith.10 The law does, in 
contrast, impose strict liability for consequential profits derived from 
breaches of fiduciary duty, reflecting an impulse to protect vulnerable 
relationships of trust and confidence. There is no prospect of the change 
of position defence being made available in this context as it would 
undercut the objectives of certainty and deterrence that the courts have 
privileged.11 Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind that breaches of 
                                                          
4 Cf Lamine v Dorell (1701) 2 Ld Ray 1216. 
5 See Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 
2011) at p 698; Paul A Walker, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: 
‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 235 
at 256. 
6 It was suggested, for example, that claimants might elect to sue in assumpsit to 
foreclose the possibility of a defendant’s resorting to wager of law: Feltham v Terry 
(1772) Lofft 207 at 209, per Aston J. 
7 See J Beatson, “The Nature of Waiver of Tort” (1978-9) 17 University of Western 
Ontario Law Review 1 at 6. Early discussions of waiver of tort generally assumed 
that an action for money had and received would lead to a lower level of recovery 
than would a claim for compensation: see Feltham v Terry (1772) Lofft 207 at 208, 
per Lord Mansfield. 
8 See J Beatson, “The Nature of Waiver of Tort” (1978-9) 17 University of Western 
Ontario Law Review 1 at 6. 
9 Indeed, the last occasion in which a claimant with an action in tort was permitted 
by a court to gain an advantage by electing to sue in assumpsit appears to have 
been over 50 years ago in Chesworth v Farrar [1967] QB 407. 
10 See Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268, Forsyth-Grant v Allen [2008] 
2 EGLR 16; [2008] EWCA Civ 505 and Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis 
SA (France) [2009] Ch 390; [2008] EWCA Civ 1086. 
11 The rule that fiduciaries may not profit from their position is strengthened by an 
approach that provides that a fiduciary will be liable for profits linked to a breach 
of duty even if the principal would have consented to the behaviour in question if 
such permission had been sought: see Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] All ER (D) 503; 
[2005] EWCA Civ 959. In addition, any benefit obtained in breach of a fiduciary 
duty will be held on trust for the principal, thereby allowing the principal to trace 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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fiduciary duty, even if committed in good faith, are never entirely 
without fault, in that the law clearly spells out the prohibitions in 
question. 
8 In practice, the change of position defence is most likely to aid a 
wrongdoer who is sued for a release fee in circumstances in which the 
claimant has suffered little or no loss. One reason the defence is 
potentially significant in this context is because the prevailing 
orthodoxy is that, even if such relief is viewed as gain-based in nature, 
claimants have the right to demand a release fee against morally 
blameless transgressors.12 It is clear that the change of position defence 
would be relevant in only a small subset of claims for release fees. While 
deliberate wrongdoers will not be in a position to avail themselves of the 
defence, morally blameless wrongdoers who have committed torts of 
strict liability, such as trespass or conversion, would be potential 
beneficiaries of the defence. The defence might, for example, protect a 
defendant who enjoyed the possession of a chattel that was given or lent 
to him and who is able to demonstrate that he changed his position in 
good faith in the belief that the transferor had good title to that chattel. 
In addition, as Cavenagh Investment illustrates, the defence might avail 
good-faith purchasers sued for a release fee that would exceed the extent 
of any consequential loss suffered by the claimant.13 
                                                                                                                               
into any profits made with the initial benefit received by the defendant: see FHR 
European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2015] 1 AC 250; [2014] 
UKSC 45. 
12 While there is no clear authority in English law for the award of release fees against 
morally blameless defendants, commentators generally assume that liability to 
make restitution in respect of the market value of the right breached is strict and 
devote attention only to the question of whether the change of position defence 
might be available: see, eg, James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, 
Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 81 and Graham Virgo, 
The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) 
ch 15. The orthodoxy in US law is that liability to account for use-value is strict: see 
Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) § 3 (providing a 
statement of general principle) and § 40 (providing the application of this principle 
to the torts of trespass and conversion). In Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik 
Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543, Chan Seng Onn J advanced on the basis that the 
defendant’s liability was strict, subject to the change of position defence. 
13 At first sight, it might be argued that the example of the good-faith purchaser does 
not represent a paradigmatic example of a relevant change of position because the 
defendant’s detrimental reliance takes place prior to or simultaneously with the 
transfer of the benefit. Nonetheless, it has been held that the defence might apply 
in cases where the relevant acts of detrimental reliance preceded the receipt of the 
benefit: Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER  
(Comm) 193; [2001] UKPC 50. This is consistent with the approach taken by Chan 
Seng Onn J in Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543, 
where the defendant, who had paid a rent to a fraudulent third party, was entitled 
to rely on the defence. 
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B. Conceptualisation of release-fee awards 
9 Many judges and some commentators have insisted on 
characterising release-fee awards as loss-based in nature. Some argue 
that this form of relief should be understood as compensation for the 
loss of an opportunity to bargain.14 However, the reality is that the courts 
do not insist on proof that, but for the defendant’s breach, the claimant 
would have realised a valuable bargain.15 Others argue that release-fee 
awards are properly characterised as compensatory not on the basis that 
they provide damages for consequential loss, but rather as compensation 
for a breach of the claimant’s right per se. According to this analysis, 
such relief repairs “normative” harms rather than factual losses.16 At 
present, however, there seems to be little judicial enthusiasm for an 
account of “vindicatory damages”.17 
10 Commonwealth courts are divided on the question as to how 
release fees should be classified. The state of the authorities in England 
and Wales has reached the confused point where awards for the rental 
value of land are treated as gain-based,18 while release fees awarded in 
other contexts are generally viewed as compensation for loss.19 Courts in 
Australia have generally favoured a loss-based interpretation of release 
                                                          
14 A seminal academic analysis in these terms was provided by Robert J Sharpe and 
S M Waddams: “Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain” (1982) 2(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 290. Important judicial expressions of this view include 
Bingham MR in Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 281–282 and Chadwick LJ 
in WWF – World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation 
Entertainment, Inc [2008] WLR 445; [2007] EWCA Civ 286. 
15 For judicial recognition that release-fee awards cannot be analysed as 
compensation for loss of a chance, see O’Brien Homes v Lane [2004] EWHC 303 
(QB) at [22], per David Clarke J, Field Common Ltd v Elmbridge Borough Council 
[2008] EWHC 2079 (Ch) at [90]–[91], per Warren J; see also Craig Rotherham, 
“‘Wrotham Park Damages’ and Accounts of Profits: Compensation or 
Restitution?” [2008] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 25 at 30. 
16 The distinction between factual and normative losses draws heavily on the work of 
Ernest Weinrib: see Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard University 
Press, 1995). For such accounts of release fees, see Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2007) at pp 67–68 and 79–84. For other accounts of 
release fees as compensatory, see Mitchell McInnes, “Gain, Loss and the User 
Principle” [2006] RLR 76; James Edelman, “Gain-Based Damages and 
Compensation” in Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Andrew 
Burrows & Alan Rodger eds) (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 141. 
17 Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] AC 245; [2011] 
UKSC 12. 
18 See Lewisham LBC v Masterson (2000) 80 P & CR 117 (CA); Gondal v Dillon 
Newsagents Ltd [2001] RLR 221; Stadium Capital Holdings v Marylebone Property 
Co plc [2010] EWCA Civ 952; Enfield LBC v Outdoor Plus Ltd [2012] 
EWCA Civ 608. 
19 See, eg, Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 281–282, per Bingham MR; WWF v 
WWF [2008] 1 WLR 445; [2007] EWCA Civ 286, per Chadwick LJ. 
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fees.20 For its part, the Singaporean judiciary has shown a willingness to 
entertain a gain-based analysis of release fees in recent years. In ACES 
System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily,21 Andrew Phang Boon 
Leong JA, delivering the judgment for the Court of Appeal of Singapore, 
suggested that, in the absence of proof of actual loss, the award of a hire 
fee in a case involving the detention of personal property might be 
regarded as restitutionary. Ultimately, however, the court did not find it 
necessary to decide the point. The potential importance of analysing the 
issue in these terms had already been made apparent a few months 
before in Cavenagh Investment, where it enabled Chan Seng Onn J to 
conclude that the defendant was entitled to rely on the change of 
position defence.22 As a consequence, the latter decision features 
prominently in this article. 
11 For the most part, little of practical importance turns on the 
conceptual distinctions at issue. Regardless of whether we classify 
release-fee awards as compensating some form of harm or as gain-based 
in nature, there is no dispute that this form of relief should indeed be 
available in the vast majority of contexts in which it is employed. This 
points to one reason for examining the question of the extent to which 
morally blameless wrongdoers may, even in the absence of claimants’ 
suffering any loss, be required to pay a release fee: for this is a context in 
which the classification of such an award may well determine the 
availability of relief. This article focuses on one possible limit on the 
liability of morally innocent wrongdoers.23 As Cavenagh Investment 
highlights, if an action is conceived of as based on the defendant’s 
enrichment, it might be asked whether the defendant might be 
permitted to limit liability by pleading the change of position defence. In 
contrast, the defence logically has no role to play if release fees are 
conceptualised as compensating the claimant’s loss. 
III. State of law on the question 
12 Much of the debate in Commonwealth jurisdictions 
surrounding the issue as to whether the change of position defence 
                                                          
20 See Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd [2011] NSWCA 342 at [175], per 
Allsop P with Macfarlan JA concurring; cf at [199]–[205], per Giles JA; Hampton v 
BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] WASC 285, per Edelman J. 
21 [2013] 4 SLR 1317. 
22 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543. 
23 Another key issue concerns the relevance of “subjective devaluation” in measuring 
the extent of the defendant’s enrichment. This is briefly addressed at paras 48–51 
below, where it is argued the application of this technique to morally blameless 
wrongdoers provides an analogy that supports the use of the change of position 
defence in this context. 
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might be available to wrongdoers has centred on remarks of Lord Goff 
in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd24 (“Lipkin”). His Lordship observed:25 
It is, of course, plain that the defence is not open to one who has 
changed his position in bad faith, as where the defendant has paid 
away the money with knowledge of the facts entitling the plaintiff to 
restitution; and it is commonly accepted that the defence should not be 
open to a wrongdoer … [emphasis added] 
13 Lord Goff did not, it would seem, use the term “wrongdoer” to 
signify those who are morally blameworthy.26 After all, any change of 
position by such an actor could not, by definition, be in good faith and 
therefore would not meet an essential precondition for the defence. In 
consequence, it may be inferred that his Lordship was using the term to 
refer simply to those who have committed a legal wrong, and his 
observation is of interest precisely because it would apply to defendants 
who acted in good faith in committing wrongs of strict liability. 
14 Lord Goff ’s remarks have subsequently not only been treated as 
if authoritative by courts, but they have been applied surprisingly 
widely.27 This reverence for the dictum in question is puzzling for at least 
three reasons. First, Lord Goff ’s remarks are plainly obiter.28 Secondly, 
his Lordship prefaced his observations by noting that, “[t]hese are 
matters which can, in due course, be considered in depth in cases where 
they arise for consideration”.29 Thirdly, his remarks regarding the 
defence and wrongdoers were presented as being no more than a 
description of received wisdom, presumably for the reason that this 
reflected the position taken in the first Restatement of Restitution.30 His 
                                                          
24 [1991] 2 AC 548. 
25 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 580. 
26 Some commentators have favoured such a reading of Lord Goff’s remarks. See Paul 
A Walker, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall 
Meet’?” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 235 at 245 and Jessica Palmer, 
“Chasing a Will-o’-the-Wisp? Making Sense of Bad Faith and Wrongdoers in 
Change of Position” [2005] RLR 53 at 76–80. 
27 See, eg, Barros-Mattos Junior v MacDaniels Ltd [2005] 1 WLR 247; [2004] 
EWHC 1188 (Ch) (dictum applied on the basis that defendant’s actions in 
changing position breached foreign exchange regulations) and FII v HMR&C 
[2008] EWHC 2893 (Ch) (state treated as a “wrongdoer” for the purposes of a 
claim based on unlawfulness of tax). 
28 See Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548. 
29 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 580. 
30 Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 142(2). The position taken in the latest 
Restatement on the issue is unclear. The fact that there is no explicit provision 
denying the defence to wrongdoers and the reporter’s comments state that defence 
cannot be used by “conscious wrongdoers” might suggest that it would be available 
to defendants who are described in the Restatement as “unconscious wrongdoers”: 
see Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) § 65, 
Comment g. On the other hand, § 65 specifies that the defence is available to 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Lordship did not suggest that he necessarily endorsed this view and he 
made no effort to subject it to critical scrutiny. 
15 Some judicial support for the view that the change of position 
defence might be available to wrongdoers can be found in Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co.31 After noting that some took the view 
that those who convert goods should be accountable for benefits gained 
as a result,32 Lord Nicholls remarked: “[l]iability in this regard should be 
strict subject to defences available to restitutionary claims such as 
change of position”.33 
16 The High Court of Singapore held that the change of position 
defence should be available in the context of a claim for mesne profits 
damages for trespass in Cavenagh Investment.34 While it is a first 
instance decision, it deserves to be taken seriously. For one thing, in 
contrast to the abstract discussion found in earlier cases addressing the 
issue, the analysis of the question is clearly part of the ratio of the case. 
In addition, Chan J’s judgment featured a careful and thorough analysis 
of the relevant authorities and academic commentary. 
17 The claimant in Cavenagh Investment was one of a group of 
companies that owned rental properties and were all owned by Ching 
Mun Fong. The rental properties were managed in turn by a company 
run by Ching and a few employees. The defendant was the victim of an 
elaborate fraud carried out by one of those employees who kept 
payments that the defendant intended to go to the landlord for himself. 
The defendant occupied the property for two and a half years in the 
honest belief that he was leasing it from the claimant. Upon discovering 
the fraud (which was part of a broader scheme including other 
properties managed by the company), the claimant brought an action 
against the defendant, claiming $352,704 on the basis that this reflected 
the property’s market rental value during the period in question. 
18 Chan J considered at length the controversy relating to the 
conceptualisation of release fees, concluding that liability could be 
                                                                                                                               
“innocent recipients”, which is to say those defendants who receive property that 
makes them liable to make restitution without them being liable for a wrong. This 
implies that it is not available to unconscious wrongdoers. 
31 [2002] 2 AC 883; [2002] UKHL 19. 
32 See para 8, n 12 above. 
33 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] 2 AC 883 at 1093; [2002] 
UKHL 19. 
34 See Rachel Leow, “Change of Position in Restitution for Wrongs: A View from 
Singapore” (2014) 130 LQR 18, Tang Hang Wu, “Taking Stock of the Change of 
Position Defence” (2015) 27 SAcLJ 148 and Kelvin Low, “The User Principle: 
Rashomon Effect or Much Ado about Nothing?” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 984 at 1000-1001. 
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compensatory, restitutionary or both depending on the facts of a 
particular case.35 However, given that the claimant had not received any 
offers to rent the property during the period, he reasoned that it could 
not be said that the defendant’s occupation of the premises had caused 
the claimant any loss.36 As a consequence, he concluded that the only 
action that the claimant could bring was one based on the defendant’s 
gain. The principal effect of this analysis was, of course, to open up the 
possibility that the change of position defence might be raised to meet 
such a claim. Chan J concluded that, on the facts of the case, the 
defendant was indeed entitled to rely on the defence. 
IV. Academic arguments against recognition of the defence in 
restitution for wrongs 
19 Commentators who take the view that the change of position 
defence should not operate in the context of restitution for wrongs make 
their case by attempting to draw salient distinctions that would justify 
denying the defence to defendants in circumstances in which it would 
be allowed in favour of a defendant in a claim for enrichment by 
subtraction. The following three sections examine different types of 
arguments made by commentators who are hostile to the notion that 
morally innocent defendants might be allowed to avail themselves of the 
change of position defence. 
A. Significance of fact that defendant has committed a wrong 
20 In arguing that the change of position defence should not be 
available in this context, it is common to emphasise that the defendants 
concerned are “wrongdoers”. The strongest claim in this regard is that it 
would be morally inappropriate to allow a defendant who has 
committed a wrong to escape liability by relying on the change of 
position defence. Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, for example, 
suggested that the maxim that “no one should profit from his own 
wrong” justifies denying the defence.37 There are a number of difficulties 
with this contention. First, in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers 
                                                          
35 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [44]–[50]. 
36 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [52]. This 
was a consequence of the claimant’s policy of insisting on letting its property only 
for very high rentals because it was “selective of its tenants”. 
37 Ross Grantham & Charles E F Rickett, Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand 
(Hart Publishing, 2000) at p 354. At one time, Andrew Burrows appeared to 
assume as much in that he treated the exclusion of the defence for tortfeasors as 
unproblematic: see Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University 
Press, 1st Ed, 1993) at p 431. Burrows now bases his opposition to the defence on 
different grounds: see para 24 below. 
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Ltd (No 2),38 Lord Goff himself observed that, “[t]he statement that a 
man shall not be allowed to profit from his own wrong is in very general 
terms and does not of itself provide any sure guidance to the solution of 
a particular problem in any particular case”.39 Secondly, the argument 
assumes that the maxim was intended to apply to morally blameless 
defendants without explaining why. In reality, the maxim draws its 
intuitive force from the notion that it would be inappropriate that the 
blameworthy should profit from their actions; it loses that force when 
applied to defendants who have clear consciences. 
21 A different suggestion is that it somehow follows from the fact 
that the wrongs in question are ones of strict liability that a defence of 
change of position should not be available. In his monograph on gain-
based relief, James Edelman suggested that to make the defence available 
in the context of conversion would be inconsistent with what he 
characterised as “a long-standing principle of English law”40 
encapsulated in Baron Cleasy’s remark in Fowler v Hollins that people 
“exercise acts of ownership over [chattels] at their peril”.41 It is difficult to 
see that the statement deserves to be characterised as a “principle” as 
such; it is more a description of the state of the law than a rationale 
justifying it. Moreover, the remark is made in the context of a claim for 
compensatory damages. The assumption that the change of position 
defence should not apply to a claim for gain because no such defence is 
available to an action for loss ignores the different bases for the two 
forms of liability in question. Where a defendant is sued in conversion 
for damages, the concern is the claimant’s loss, and nothing that the 
defendant has done to change his position in reliance on his right to a 
chattel alters the claimant’s situation in this regard. Where, in contrast, 
the defendant is sued for a gain, evidence of a change of position is 
relevant to show that it would be unfair to require the defendant to 
account to the claimant for that gain. Given the quite different 
normative foundations of the two actions, there is no necessary 
inconsistency in holding that a change of position might provide a 
defence to one action but not the other. 
22 Strict liability for loss in conversion is more an accident of 
history than the realisation of some well-defended principle.42 Indeed, it 
                                                          
38 [1990] 1 AC 109. 
39 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 286; see 
also Paul A Walker, “Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the 
Twain Shall Meet’?” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 235 at 253. 
40 James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual 
Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 96. 
41 (1872) LR 7 QB 616 at 639. 
42 See David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) at p 112; S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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is difficult to justify imposing liability for loss on a morally blameless 
defendant.43 Nevertheless, it is clear that strict liability for loss is so 
firmly established that the courts are unlikely to contemplate reversing 
this position, nor are they likely to be inclined to extend its reach.44 The 
law relating to restitutionary liability for wrongs is, in contrast, 
undeveloped and, indeed, is still often treated by the courts as 
anomalous.45 In light of this and of the relatively recent recognition of 
the change of position defence, the courts have a choice to make in 
determining the scope of gain-based liability. There is little to be said for 
holding that the defence should be denied in this context simply to 
ensure that liability for gain is as strict as liability for loss. 
B. Notion that change of position defence is analytically specific 
to claims for subtractive enrichment 
23 Some commentators have advanced accounts that are essentially 
analytical in nature to explain why the defence should not be available in 
this context. Those who take the view that the change of position 
defence has a role to play in restitution for wrongs tend to reason that 
the defence should be available by analogy with its use in cases of 
enrichment by subtraction, on the basis that both are concerned with 
unjust gains. Those who, in contrast, take the position that the defence 
should not be available to wrongdoers reason that the analogy is a weak 
one. In their view, the rationale of the change of position defence reflects 
concerns which equally inform the principles underlying subtractive 
unjust enrichment but which are quite alien to the norms providing 
relief for restitution for wrongs. 
                                                                                                                               
Common Law (Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 1981) at p 378; Simon Douglas, “The Nature 
of Conversion” (2009) 68(1) Cambridge Law Journal 198 at 199; Paul A Walker, 
“Change of Position and Restitution for Wrongs: ‘Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet’?” 
(2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 235 at 257. 
43 Indeed, Simon Douglas recently observed that “[p]ractitioners and courts are 
clearly uncomfortable with the strict liability of the action”: Simon Douglas, “The 
Nature of Conversion” (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 198 at 198. 
44 A good indication of this is the refusal of the House of Lords to extend conversion 
to cover interferences with choses in action in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1; 
[2007] UKHL 21. Lord Hoffmann, in particular, showed a concern with extending 
the reach of strict liability. 
45 For illustrations of judicial tendency to regard gain-based relief as exceptional, see 
Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 (CA); [1988] 
3 All ER 394 (CA) at 397, per Nourse LJ, Surrey County Council v Bredero 
Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 (CA) at 1369–1370 (CA), per Steyn LJ and Halifax 
Building Society v Thomas [1996] Ch 217 (CA) at 227–228, per Peter Gibson LJ. 
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24 In this vein, Andrew Burrows explained his conclusion that the 
defence is unavailable to innocent wrongdoers on the basis that:46 
[C]hange of position is inextricably bound up with the cause of action 
of unjust enrichment [that is, enrichment by subtraction] alone and … 
ensuring security of receipt, which is one of the purposes of change of 
position, is simply not relevant to restitution for wrongs. A cause of 
action of unjust enrichment requires a reversal of a transfer of value 
for reasons that do not relate to the need to ‘remedy’ a wrong so that, 
while change of position operates to counter the non-wrongful 
transfer of value, it cannot ever outweigh the policies justifying 
restitution for a wrong … 
Burrows based his conclusion in part on the notion that the change of 
position defence is available in the context of cases of enrichment by 
subtraction for reasons that do not apply in cases of enrichment by 
wrongs. It would be difficult to disagree with the claim that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between the rationale for the use of the defence 
in the context of subtractive enrichment, on the one hand, and in 
relation to enrichment by wrongs, on the other. It seems reasonable to 
say that “security of receipt” is not relevant in the context of restitution 
for wrongs because this category is not concerned with transfers of 
wealth from the claimant. On the other hand, it is less clear that this 
analytical distinction carries the normative significance that Burrows 
attributed to it. Defendants who have without fault occupied land or 
possessed goods have a reasonable expectation that they should not be 
required to account for the value of their use of such assets. This interest 
in the “security of benefits” resulting from such an innocent 
infringement can appropriately be addressed through the change of 
position defence. 
25 Burrows’ account appears to assume that the centrality of the 
policy of “security of receipt” to the concept of change of position 
demonstrates that the defence has no role in the context of restitution 
for wrongs. Yet, the premise on which his argument rests does not 
appear to be powerful enough to support this conclusion. Burrows 
claims only that security of receipt is “one of the purposes” of the 
defence; he does not make the argument that it is so central to the 
defence that, logically, it can operate only in response to transfers of 
value from the claimant. A transfer of value from the claimant is simply 
one way in which the defendant may be enriched. There is no reason 
a priori why such a transfer should be a necessary condition for the 
availability of the change of position defence. 
                                                          
46 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) 
at pp 699–700. 
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26 It is far from clear that a concern with security of receipt should 
be regarded as being at the heart of the change of position defence. After 
all, if it were an overwhelming concern, it would justify holding that the 
innocent receipt of a benefit per se gave rise to a defence, without 
insisting on the presence of detrimental reliance. Equally, if security of 
receipt were so important, the defence should operate to excuse the 
defendant of liability completely rather than operating to eliminate it 
only to the extent of any change of position. The fact that the defence 
applies only to the extent that defendants have changed their position in 
good faith to their detriment suggests that the defence is not concerned 
with security of receipt per se; rather, its concern is with the unfairness 
of requiring restitution in these circumstances.47 There is no obvious 
reason why such a concern should not equally arise in some cases of 
restitution for wrongs. 
27 Finally, even if we assumed the validity of the premises of 
Burrows’ analysis, there is no reason to accept the conclusion that he 
derived from them. Even if it were true that the change of position 
defence were deployed in cases of unjust enrichment by subtraction 
because of a concern with the security of receipt, it would not logically 
follow that it might not be made available in the context of restitution 
for wrongs for other reasons. 
28 In Cavenagh Investment, Chan J noted Burrows’ analysis of the 
area in considering whether a morally blameless defendant might 
benefit from the change of position defence in the context of a claim to 
recover a release fee in the form of mesne profit damages.48 Ultimately, 
he rejected Burrows’ preference for a blanket exclusion of the defence in 
this context, favouring instead an approach that considered whether the 
policies underlying the particular wrong outweighed the rationale for 
the defence.49 
C. Policy-based justifications for denial of the defence 
29 A third type of rationale for denying that the change of positon 
defence has any role in restitution for wrongs evokes considerations of 
policy. Here, the suggestion is that allowing the defence would in some 
way be inconsistent with the policies underlying the defendant’s wrong. 
30 Elise Bant, the author of a monograph on the defence, took a 
more cautious position. While she suggested that there is no reason in 
principle why the change of position defence should not be used in the 
                                                          
47 See Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 215. 
48 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [62]. 
49 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [63]–[64]. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Morally Blameless Wrongdoers and  
 Change of Position Defence  
 
context of wrongs of strict liability, she concluded that the extension of 
the defence in such circumstances raises difficult policy questions. This 
led her to make the following observation:50 
Unfortunately, it is not a question capable of general reply. Each wrong 
must be individually addressed to see whether recognition of a change 
of position defence would undermine the law’s prohibition. Certainly 
the position taken by the law to date in respect of innocent converters 
and breaching fiduciaries has indicated that it will. This is most likely 
because permitting the defence is seen to undermine the protection of 
claimants’ proprietary rights in the first case and because of the need 
to deter breaches of fiduciary duty in the second … 
31 It is difficult to disagree with the notion that a nuanced 
approach is desirable and that we should resist the urge to offer 
universal answers. Moreover, Bant’s suggestion that special 
considerations apply in the context of fiduciaries is very plausible.51 
However, the notion that the courts have already taken a position on the 
availability of the defence for innocent converters is unconvincing. We 
should, moreover, be suspicious of vague appeals to notions of absolute 
property rights that hardly do justice to the nuanced manner in which 
the common law protects rights to different resources in diverse 
contexts.52 The interest in protecting one party’s proprietary rights that 
would be promoted by holding wrongdoers liable for any benefit must 
be judiciously balanced against a morally blameless defendant’s interest 
in freedom of action. An appropriate balance would not be struck if such 
defendants were held strictly liable to make restitution despite having 
their changed position to their detriment. 
32 In Cavenagh Investment, Chan J adopted Bant’s view that the 
courts should consider whether the policy objectives underlying a 
particular wrong would be unduly undermined by the application of the 
change of position defence.53 His Lordship cited Bant’s conclusion that 
the reasons for granting the defence were likely to be overridden by 
policy considerations favouring the protection of property rights.54 He 
then proceeded, however, to apply the defence in just such a case, baldly 
stating, “I do not think that there is any overriding policy rationale 
requiring the remedying of the wrong of trespass to land with the award 
of restitutionary damages that would be stultified by the application of 
                                                          
50 Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 172. 
51 Craig Rotherham, “Deterrence as a Justification for Awarding Accounts of Profits” 
(2012) 32(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 537 at 549. 
52 Craig Rotherham, “The Normative Foundations of Restitution for Wrongs: 
Justifying Gain-Based Relief for Nuisance” in The Goals of Private Law (Andrew 
Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds) (Hart Publishing, 2009) at pp 400–407. 
53 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [63]–[64]. 
54 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [63] 
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the change of position defence”.55 Thus, he concluded that the defendant 
was entitled to be relieved of liability for the period during which he was 
unaware of the claimant’s rights.56 
V. Normative basis for recognising change of position as defence 
to claims for release-fee awards 
A. “Core case”: Changes of position involving beneficial 
dissipation of enrichment 
33 Most of the discussion regarding the basis and scope of the 
defence has centred on a type of case that has been treated as the 
paradigmatic example of a relevant change of position. This “core case”, 
as Bant has described it,57 involves a defendant whose receipt of a benefit 
leads him to indulge in expenditure or consumption of assets that he 
otherwise would have avoided. To the extent that the defendant incurs 
such expenditure or indulges in such consumption, it is argued that 
there is no “surviving enrichment”.58 
34 The application of the defence in these circumstances is often 
described as responding to “disenrichment”.59 An argument that is 
sometimes made in these terms is that such evidence of dissipation of 
assets goes further than simply providing the basis of a defence to a 
claim for unjust enrichment.60 Instead, it is reasoned, such evidence 
indicates that the defendant was not enriched at all. Understood in this 
way, a plea of change of position might be interpreted not as raising a 
                                                          
55 Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [65]. 
56 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [73]. 
57 See Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at pp 2–3. 
58 Peter Birks, “Change of Position and Surviving Enrichment” in The Limits of 
Restitutionary Claims: A Comparative Analysis (William Swadling ed) (United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 1997). 
59 See Tang Hang Wu, “Taking Stock of the Change of Position Defence” (2015) 
27 SAcLJ 148 at 156. The scope of the change of position defence in cases of unjust 
enrichment by subtraction is a matter of contention. In Australian Financial 
Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2014] HCA 14, the Australian 
High Court favoured a broad conception of the defence and concluded that, in 
instances where it was difficult to value the extent of the detriment suffered by the 
defendant as the result of a change of position, the defence should operate to 
exclude liability altogether. While there is English appellate authority that would 
appear sympathetic with such a broad approach (see, eg, Commerzbank AG v Price-
Jones [2003] EWCA Civ 1663), there is equally a strong current of opinion among 
English academics that provides that the defence should permit defendants to 
avoid liability only so far as they can establish that a change of position has resulted 
in “disenrichment”. This controversy is beyond the scope of this article. 
60 For an account and evaluation of such arguments, see Elise Bant, The Change of 
Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at pp 126–130. 
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defence properly speaking but rather as an argument that the claimant 
has not established an element necessary to his cause of action.61 
35 This analysis is misconceived. Where the change of position 
takes the form of the dissipation of wealth for the defendant’s own 
benefit, the absence of surviving enrichment does not imply that the 
defendant was not enriched as result. The fact that the defendant 
dissipated wealth on goods or services of his choosing suggests that he 
could not deny that he valued those benefits. The best justification of the 
defence is that, despite his enrichment, it would be unfair to require the 
defendant to make restitution because the receipt of the benefit in 
question caused him to indulge in expenditure in a fashion that would 
not have reflected his spending priorities had he been aware that he 
would have to account for that benefit. In cases of enrichment by 
subtraction, this reflects a judgment that a good faith defendant’s 
interest in making fully informed spending choices outweighs the fact 
that the defendant has been enriched by a transfer of wealth from the 
claimant. 
36 The argument for holding morally blameless defendants liable 
for their gains in the first place is relatively unpersuasive. Where a claim 
is made for enrichment by subtraction, the defendant’s gain is equal to 
the claimant’s loss. In terms of moral desert, the claimant in such a 
situation has a particularly compelling case for relief.62 After all, an 
award of restitution will do no more than return the parties to the 
status quo ante, while a refusal to grant such relief will leave the 
defendant enjoying an enrichment corresponding to the loss suffered by 
the claimant. On the other hand, actions for enrichment “by wrongs” are 
based upon the fact that the defendant’s enrichment represents a profit 
derived from a wrong to the claimant, without relying on establishing 
that the claimant has suffered an equivalent loss. Justifying the provision 
of relief on such a basis is in some ways harder, and English courts have 
tended to be somewhat reluctant to accept that it should be widely 
available.63 Generally, the intuition that gain-based relief should be 
awarded for a wrong follows from the view that it would be appropriate 
to punish and/or deter those who have profited from blameworthy 
conduct. Adopting this perspective, the case for holding deliberate 
wrongdoers liable for their gains appears to be straightforward. The 
conventional view that even morally blameless defendant should pay a 
release fee for any advantage gained from a wrong is harder to justify. 
                                                          
61 See, eg, Mitchell McInnes, “Enrichment Revisited” in Understanding Unjust 
Enrichment (Jason W Neyers, Mitchell McInnes & Stephen G A Pitel eds) (Hart 
Publishing, 2004) at p 196. 
62 L L Fuller & William R Perdue Jr, “The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages” 
(1936) 46 Yale LJ 52 at 56. 
63 See para 22, n 45 above. 
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The willingness to impose liability on such defendants suggests that 
there is a rights-based justification for such relief. However, the basis of 
any such right has not been adequately explained and can only be 
regarded as fragile at best. 
37 It follows that it should be relatively easier to explain why a 
morally innocent wrongdoer should be able to rely on the change of 
position defence than it is to justify the provision of that protection to a 
defendant in an action for subtractive enrichment. In the first instance, 
allowing the defence would do no more than deny the claimant a 
windfall, leaving him in the position he was in before the wrong. In 
contrast, in the latter context, allowing a defendant to raise the defence 
leaves the claimant to suffer a loss. 
38 It would be useful to consider in some detail instances in which 
the defence might be raised in circumstances in which the defendant 
made use of the claimant’s property for his own benefit in reliance on his 
presumed entitlement to do so. Consider, firstly, an example from the 
original Restatement of Restitution:64 
A transfers the title to his car to B because of B’s fraudulent 
misrepresentations. B lends the car to C who has no notice of the 
fraud. C uses it for business purposes for a period of four months and 
then stores it for a further period of two months. Upon learning of the 
facts, C returns the car. A is entitled to restitution from C of the 
reasonable value of the use of the car for four months. 
Let us assume that C needed a car during the period in which he used 
the vehicle in question and would have had to have rented one if he had 
not benefited from the gift from B. As a result, there is no difficulty in 
saying that C was incontrovertibly benefited by his use of A’s property. 
The result contemplated in the Restatement would seem relatively 
uncontroversial if we could say that C’s use deprived A of the use of his 
car, as this would effectively present itself as a case of restitution by 
subtraction where A suffers a loss that corresponds to C’s gain. 
Alternatively, such a result could be provided for by a claim for 
consequential loss, for which defendants are plainly strictly liable in 
conversion. What is more contentious is that a defendant might be 
strictly liable for an enrichment that does not correspond to any loss 
suffered by the claimant. Let us imagine, then, that the facts are that 
A had already bought a new car and was persuaded to sell his second 
car, which was not in use, to B (who paid with a cheque that was 
subsequently dishonoured). Let us, equally, assume that C is able to 
demonstrate that, treating the saved expenditure as a windfall, he spent 
an equivalent sum on an overseas vacation. With the addition of these 
                                                          
64 Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 157, Comment e, Illus 7. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Morally Blameless Wrongdoers and  
 Change of Position Defence  
 
facts, the scenario provides a good basis for considering whether an 
innocent converter should be entitled to resort to the change of position 
defence. 
39 The case in favour of allowing the defence in the context of this 
example is an easy one. A’s claim is a relatively weak one. Should there be 
a claim against C simply because he enjoyed the valuable use of A’s car, if 
A suffered no harm from the episode? While that result is not 
particularly shocking, is it really justified? Why should C be liable to 
pay A a sum that he would never have earned otherwise? It might be 
argued that this is a windfall that should be left to lie where it fell. The 
contrary argument is, of course, that a defendant should not enjoy a gain 
from breaching someone else’s rights. What seems clear, however, is that 
the change of position on the part of C would make the imposition of 
gain-based liability manifestly unjust. To require such a defendant to 
make restitution would be to disregard his interest in determining his 
own spending priorities while giving a claimant a windfall for no 
compelling reason. 
B. Beyond the “core”: Changes of position resulting in defendants’ 
deriving no enrichment 
40 As mentioned, most of the discussion regarding the basis and 
scope of the defence has centred on what has been treated as “the core 
case”, in which the defendant argues that his receipt of the advantage in 
question caused him to indulge in exceptional expenditure and that his 
liability should be limited only to any enrichment that “survives”.65 
A feature of such cases where the defence is applied on this basis is that 
defendants are excused of liability despite the fact they were personally 
enriched by the dissipation of wealth involved in their change of 
position. 
41 Instances where the gist of the defence is that there is no extant 
enrichment because the defendants have dissipated wealth may be 
contrasted with circumstances where the defendant is able to 
demonstrate that his change of position was such that he derived no 
gain from the benefit in question. This may happen in quite different 
ways. One example is provided by agents who pay over benefits to their 
principals.66 While English law recognised a defence in these 
circumstances prior to the recognition of the change of position, the 
protection afforded to agents in these circumstances is regarded in 
American law as a particular application of the more general defence. 
Equally, Lord Goff suggested that the law’s approach to this problem 
                                                          
65 See paras 33–35 above. 
66 Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) § 65, Comment b. 
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“can arguably be said to rest upon change of position”.67 Another 
example of such a change of position is provided by instances where a 
third party tricks a claimant to transferring a benefit to the defendant 
who is equally fooled into passing that benefit onto the fraudster.68 
A third type of case falling within this category involves defendants who 
act to their detriment by providing consideration in circumstances in 
which the bona fide purchaser defence is not available.69 A final 
illustration of such a case might be one where the defendant changes his 
position not in acquiring goods or services for his own benefit but 
instead gives the money away to a third party.70 
42 There is a normatively salient distinction to be drawn between 
cases in which the basis for the defence is that the defendant changed his 
position by dissipating enrichment and those where he can argue that 
his actions were such that he gained no net enrichment from the benefit. 
Whereas the aphorism that a defendant should not profit from a wrong 
still has force in the former case, it has no relevance in the latter. Indeed, 
it is difficult to see what the argument could be for compelling a 
defendant who acted without fault to account for the receipt of a benefit 
from which he ultimately derived no enrichment. The defendant would 
not be required simply to account for a gain but would rather be left to 
suffer a net loss. This result would be particularly difficult to justify in 
the context of restitution for wrongs as the outcome would involve not a 
bid by the claimant to shift a loss onto the defendant but rather an 
attempt to obtain a windfall. 
43 It is mysterious quite why cases of beneficial dissipation of 
wealth have been treated as so essential to the analysis of the change of 
position defence in the Commonwealth. Lipkin, the decision in which 
the defence was recognised in English law was, indeed, a case in which 
the defendant avoided liability to the extent that it gained no net 
enrichment from its receipt of the traceable proceeds of the claimant’s 
property. In his judgment, Lord Goff supported the recognition of the 
defence by relying on examples in which defendants’ actions would  
have arguably resulted in them obtaining no net advantage.71 
Lord Templeman, in contrast, invoked instances of extraordinary 
                                                          
67 [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL) at 578; see also Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence 
(Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 65. 
68 See, eg, Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER 
(Comm) 193. 
69 See, eg, Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 and Cavenagh Investment 
Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543. 
70 See the examples given by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 
2 AC 548 at 579. 
71 The examples involve defendants paying the money over to charity: see Lipkin 
Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 579. 
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expenditure to illuminate his discussion of the defence.72 It is the latter 
form of change of position that has generally attracted attention in 
academic discussion. 
44 Such a focus on instances of beneficial dissipation of wealth is 
not apparent in the Restatements of Restitution. Most of the examples of 
the defence provided in the original Restatement involve defendants 
who have derived no net enrichment from their change of position.73 In 
the most recent Restatement, the defence is justified on the basis that 
liability to make restitution in full “without deduction … would exceed 
the net enrichment of the recipient attributable to the transaction with 
the claimant”.74 
45 One result of the failure to focus on the difference between 
instances of dissipation of wealth, on the one hand, and cases of no net 
enrichment, on the other, is that it has encouraged an assumption that 
there is a single rationale for permitting a defendant to escape liability. 
The reality is that the justifications for excusing a defendant of liability 
are quite discrete in these two instances; and the case for permitting a 
defence in situations where a defendant gains no net enrichment is 
patently stronger than it is on occasions involving the extraordinary 
dissipation of wealth for the defendant’s own benefit. It follows that it 
would not be unprincipled for a legal system to choose to deny a defence 
in cases of dissipation of wealth but to allow it in instances where the 
defendant derived no net enrichment. This is indeed consistent with the 
fact that a defence was afforded to agents who had passed on the benefit 
following their principals’ instructions long before the recognition of a 
wider change of position defence. 
46 Equally, there are signs in American law that, despite the 
orthodoxy that those who have committed a tort should not be 
permitted to avail themselves of the change of position defence, 
defendants who have gained no enrichment from the benefit in question 
might be permitted to escape liability. Thus, in the example from the 
original Restatement of Restitution, cited above, it is concluded without 
explanation that the defendant would not be liable for a period in which 
he was in possession of the claimant’s car but made no use of it.75 While 
a market value could be attached to the possession of the vehicle, it is 
assumed that the defendant should be excused of liability to the extent 
that he derived no actual benefit from his custody of it. This result is 
explained as “being based upon the principle which underlies § 142 
                                                          
72 See Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 560. 
73 See Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 142, Comment b. 
74 Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011) § 65, Comment a. 
75 Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 157, Comment e, Illus 7; see also para 38 above. 
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dealing with change of position”.76 Yet, it is difficult to square this 
explanation with the Restatement’s position that the defence is not 
available to tortfeasors. 
47 It is against this background that we can appreciate why the 
argument for allowing the defendant the protection of the change of 
position was irresistible in the context of a claim for mesne profits in 
Cavenagh Investment.77 The case for allowing the defence was an easy 
one. The claimant was not in a position to demonstrate that it had 
suffered any loss as a result of the defendant’s trespass, while the 
defendant had in good faith paid the market rental rate for the premises 
in question and thus derived no net enrichment from his transgression. 
In these circumstances, there was no compelling reason to hold the 
defendant liable to pay a fee reflecting the market rental price. The only 
gain-stripping claim that would have been appropriate would have been 
one against the claimant’s fraudulent employee. 
C. Change of position and subjective devaluation 
48 The notion that the change of position defence has no place in 
the law of restitution for wrongs is undermined by the willingness of 
English courts to respond to autonomy-focused concerns by allowing 
certain wrongdoers to avoid liability by pleading that they did not freely 
choose a benefit and should not be held liable to the extent that they 
were not incontrovertibly enriched.78 The seminal decision on the 
question is Ministry of Defence v Ashman79 (“Ashman”). The defendant 
continued, out of necessity, to occupy housing provided by the claimant 
after being lawfully required to vacate the premises. A majority of the 
UK Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant’s liability should be 
limited to reflect rents charged for subsidised accommodation provided 
by local authorities.80 Hoffmann LJ characterised this treatment as 
“subjective devaluation” of the benefit in question.81 Given that the 
defendant in Ashman was allowed to “devalue” the relevant benefit 
despite the fact that she had deliberately committed an act of trespass, it 
                                                          
76 Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 157, Comment e. 
77 For a discussion of the case, see paras 16–18 above. 
78 For an analysis of the issue, see Craig Rotherham, “Subjective Valuation of 
Enrichment in Restitution for Wrongs” [2017] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial 
Law 412. 
79 [1993] 2 EGLR 102 (CA). 
80 See Ministry of Defence v Ashman [1993] 2 EGLR 102 (CA) at 104–105, per 
Kennedy LJ and at 105, per Hoffmann LJ. 
81 See Ministry of Defence v Ashman [1993] 2 EGLR 102 (CA) at 105. Just 6 months 
later, in Ministry of Defence v Thompson [1993] 2 EGLR 107 (CA), a case with 
similar facts, the UK Court of Appeal unanimously applied the same approach. 
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
 Morally Blameless Wrongdoers and  
 Change of Position Defence  
 
is scarcely disputable that a defendant who has breached a claimant’s 
rights unknowingly and without fault would be entitled to do the same. 
49 The use of the change of position defence in cases of beneficial 
dissipation of enrichment and the doctrine of subjective devaluation 
share a concern with ensuring that a defendant’s freedom of choice is 
protected. Subjective devaluation, on the one hand, is concerned with 
benefits that are not incontrovertibly enriching and which were not 
freely chosen by defendants.82 As mentioned, in the context of the “core 
case”, the change of position defence is concerned with decisions to 
expend wealth that are not fully informed for the reason that the 
defendants did not understand they would have to account for the value 
dissipated.83 Prior to the recognition of the change of position defence, 
Peter Birks argued that the strongest argument for such a defence was 
provided by the concern for defendants’ autonomy demonstrated by the 
willingness of the courts to allow defendants to subjectively devalue 
benefits.84 Given that the concept of subjective devaluation and the 
defence of change of position both respond to a concern for the 
autonomy of good faith defendants, it is implausible to suggest that we 
might allow morally blameless wrongdoers to subjectively devalue 
benefits and yet maintain the view that the change of position defence is 
excluded as a matter of analytic logic. It is not surprising then that those 
academics who argue that the change of position defence has no role to 
play in restitution for wrongs are critical of the use of subjective 
devaluation in this context.85 
50 Birks was, nevertheless, overstating the case when he suggested 
that the protection afforded by these two concepts is so analogous that 
one could not logically permit defendants the benefit of subjective 
devaluation while denying the change of position defence in cases that 
involve extraordinary expenditure incurred for the defendant’s own 
benefit. While it is true that the two concepts share a concern with 
defendants’ autonomy, the arguments for holding that defendants who 
cannot be shown to have valued a benefit should not have to account for 
it are stronger than those for excusing defendants who have been 
subjectively enriched by the wrong in question but have dissipated that 
                                                          
82 On the role of subjective devaluation in protecting defendants’ autonomy, see 
Mitchell McInnes, “Enrichments and Reasons for Restitution: Protecting Freedom 
of Choice” (2003) 48 McGill LJ 419 and A V M Lodder, Enrichment in the Law of 
Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 6. 
83 See para 35 above. 
84 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Rev 
Ed, 1989) at p 413. 
85 See Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 
2011) at p 626 and James Edelman, Gain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity 
and Intellectual Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 71. 
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enrichment in good faith. In the first instance, the defendant’s case is 
that the claimant cannot prove that the defendant valued the enrichment 
at all. In the second instance, the defendant seeks to avoid being held to 
account for enrichment that he plainly did prize. It follows that it would 
not be logically inconsistent to draw a line in balancing the interests of 
claimants seeking restitution against the autonomy of defendants by 
allowing morally blameless defendants to plead subjective devaluation 
but denying them the change of position defence. Such an approach 
might be taken in relation to restitution for wrongs, although it would 
be difficult to explain why the law should strike a balance in this context 
that is different from that favoured in relation to cases of enrichment by 
subtraction. 
51 It would, on the other hand, be impossible to justify allowing 
defendants to plead subjective devaluation while denying the change of 
position defence in cases in which a morally blameless defendant gained 
no net enrichment as a result of the wrong. A defendant who is able to 
demonstrate that he was not personally enriched as a result of a wrong 
has a stronger case for escaping liability than does one who simply relies 
on the fact that the claimant cannot conclusively prove that the 
defendant valued the benefit in question. 
VI. “Crossing the line” – Further issues to be determined in 
delimiting availability of the defence in release-fee cases 
52 A good proportion of scholars reflecting on the subject favour 
the view that the change of position defence should be available in 
response to a claim for gain-based relief in the context of wrongs of 
strict liability.86 These commentators have, however, offered few details 
as to how the defence would operate. In the process, they have failed to 
heed Birks’ warning that while, “[i]t may be difficult to hold [the] line” 
that wrongdoers cannot avail themselves of the change of position 
defence, “it will also be difficult to know how to cross it”.87 
                                                          
86 See Richard Nolan, “Change of Position” in Laundering and Tracing (P B H Birks 
ed) (Clarendon Press, 1995) at pp 153–154, Charles Harpum, “Knowing Receipt: 
The Need for a New Landmark: Some Reflections” in Restitution: Past, Present & 
Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (W R Cornish, Richard Nolan, 
J O’Sullivan &G Virgo eds) (Hart Publishing, 1998) at p 250, Phillip Hellwege, 
“The Scope of Application of Change of Position in the Law of Unjust Enrichment: 
A Comparative Study” [1999] RLR 92, Andrew Tettenborn, The Law of Restitution 
(Cavendish Press, 3rd Ed, 2001) at p 278, Graham Virgo, Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2015) at p 693, John D McCamus, 
“Rethinking Section 142 of the Restatement of Restitution: Fault, Bad Faith and 
Change of Position” (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 889 at 919 and Goff and Jones: 
The Law of Restitution (Gareth Jones ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th Ed, 2009) at p 866. 
87 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2005) at p 98. 
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53 One question that would have to be addressed is whether 
wrongdoers seeking to raise the defence would be subject to the same 
preconditions that apply in respect of subtractive unjust enrichment 
claims, for which the defence is available provided the defendant acted 
in good faith.88 Chan J in Cavenagh Investment,89 concluded that, even if 
he had taken the view that the defendant had been careless in the course 
of being defrauded by the claimant’s employee, the defence ought still to 
have been available.90 
54 It might be objected that the assumption that the defence should 
equally be available to all good faith wrongdoers is misconceived. We 
allow a good faith recipient of an enrichment transferred to him without 
any wrongdoing on his part to raise the defence, even if he acted 
carelessly in changing his position, because he owed no duty of care to 
the claimant in these circumstances. A defendant who has, in contrast, 
gained from breaching the claimant’s rights before changing his position 
by dissipating wealth for his own benefit does not necessarily deserve 
the same protection. While defendants in enrichment-by-subtraction 
claims have typically had their enrichment thrust upon them as result of 
a mistake on the claimant’s part, a defendant in an enrichment-by-
wrongs claim has acquired the benefit as a result of breaching the 
claimant’s rights. Thus, it might reasonably be thought that a different 
balance should be struck where the defence is raised in the context of 
restitution by wrongs. 
55 It may be that in negotiating the threshold for the defence, we 
should play closer attention to different types of change of position than 
we do in cases of subtractive unjust enrichment. Where the defendant’s 
actions are such that he does not ultimately gain from the breach in 
question, there is a strong case for concluding that good faith should be 
a sufficient requirement for establishing the defence. Thus, on the facts 
of Cavenagh Investment, where the defendant was a bona fide purchaser 
of a possessory interest in land, Chan J was probably right to conclude 
that, even if the court had taken the view that the defendant had been 
careless in the course of being defrauded by the claimant’s employee, the 
defence ought still to have been available.91 
56 On the other hand, it is hardly clear that it would be desirable to 
permit a defendant who has carelessly breached another’s rights to be 
excused from paying a release fee where his change of position involved 
dissipating the benefit received for his own benefit. In such a case, it 
                                                          
88 Dextra Bank & Trust Co Ltd v Bank of Jamaica [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193. 
89 For an analysis of the case, see paras 16–18 and 47 above. 
90 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [72]. 
91 See Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [72]. 
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might be preferable to make the defence available only to those 
defendants who have acted without fault and to deny it to defendants 
who ought to have been aware that they were infringing another’s rights. 
VII. Conclusion 
57 The question of the liability of innocent wrongdoers for benefits 
derived from breaching a claimant’s rights raises a series of interesting 
normative issues. In addition, this inquiry has the virtue of throwing 
light upon an unresolved disagreement concerning demarcation of the 
boundary between gain-based and compensatory relief. This rather 
fundamental issue of taxonomy has proved to be intractable in large part 
because it has seemed to be without practical consequence. Studying the 
question of the liability of morally blameless wrongdoers to pay a release 
fee is useful precisely because the way in which such relief is classified 
will determine the choices we have in deciding whether such liability 
should be subject to the change of position defence. This article suggests 
that the defence should be available to morally blameless wrongdoers 
and that none of the arguments to the contrary withstand close analysis. 
The autonomy of such defendants is as deserving of respect as that of 
those who are sued for enrichment by subtraction. It follows that it is 
imperative that release fees should be understood as gain-based, because 
it is only if they are so categorised that the courts will be able to do 
justice for morally blameless wrongdoers. Questions remain to be 
answered as to the preconditions for the use of the defence in restitution 
for wrongs. It should not be assumed that the defence should be 
available to all good-faith defendants in the way that it is in cases of 
unjust enrichment by subtraction. Nor should it be presumed that all 
forms of changes of position should be protected in the same way that 
they are in the context of unjust enrichment by subtraction. In the 
context of restitution for wrongs, there are good reasons for 
distinguishing between defendants who have personally benefited from 
their change of position and those whose alteration of circumstances 
results in them obtaining no net enrichment. 
 
